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I. Introduction 
Throughout many of the less developed economies of the world, espe-
cially those of Tropical Africa, a curious economic phenomenon is presently 
taking place. Despite the existence of positive marginal products in 
and significant levels of urban unemployment, 
agriculture/ rural-urban labour migration not only continues to exist but, 
indeed, appears to be accelerating. Conventional economic models with 
their singular dependence on the achievement of a full employment equilib-
rium through appropriate wage and price adjustments are hard put to provide 
rational behavioural explanations for these sizable and growing levels 
of urban unemployment in the absence of absolute labour redundancy in the 
economy as a whole. Moreover, this lack of an adequate analytical model 
to account for the unemployment phenomenon often leads to rather amorphous 
explanations such as the "bright lights" of the city acting as a magnet 
to lure peasants into urban areas. 
in this paper we shall diverge from the usual full employment flexible 
wage-price models of economic analysis by formulating a two-sector model of 
rural-urban migration which,among other things, recognizes the existence of 
a politically determined minimum urban wage substantially higher than 
agricultural earnings.''" Ke shall then consider the effect of this' paramet-
ric urban wage cn the rural individual's economic behaviour when the 
assumption of no agricultural labour surplus is made - i.e. that the agri-
cultural marginal product is always positive and inversely related to the 
? size of the rural labour fcrce. " The distinguishing feature of this model 
is that migration proceed" in response to urban-rural differences in 
the rate 
expected earnings (defined below) with/urban employment/acting as an 
3 
equlibrating force cn.such migration. T7e shall then use the overall model 
for the following purposes: 
1. to demonstrate that given a politically determined fixed minimum wage 
at levels significantly exceeding rural marginal real products, the 
continued existence of rural-urban migration in spite of substantial 
overt urban unemployment represents : an:economically rational choice on 
the part of the individual migrant;/ 
2. to consider the direct effects of agricultural price controls (e.g. 
marketing boards, fixed deliveries, etc.) on the level of urban 
unemployment, an aspect of agricultural pricing policies which has 
rarely been given its just recognition; 
3. to show that the economists* standard policy prescription of generat-
ing urban employment opportunities through the use of "shadow prices" 
implemented by means of wage subsidies or direct government hiring 
will not necessarily lead to a welfare improvement and may, in fact, 
exacerbate the problem of urban unemployment; 
4. to evaluate the welfare implications of alternative policies associated 
with various "back to the land" programs when it is recognized that 
the standard remedy suggested by economic theory - namely, full wage 
flexibility - is for all practical purposes politically infeasible. 
Special attention will be given here to the impact of migration cum 
unemployment on the welfare of the rural sector as a whole which gives 
rise to intersectoral compensation requirements; and, finally, 
5. to argue that the optimal policy is, in fact, a "policy package" includ-
ing both partial wage subsidies (or direct government employment) and 
measures to restrict free migration. 
II. The Basic Model 
The basic model which we shall employ can be described as a two-sector 
internal trade model with unemployment. The two sectors are the permanent 
urban and the rural. For analytical purposes we shall distinguish between 
sectors from the point of view of production and income. Specifically, it 
is assumed that the urban sector specializes in the production of a manufac-
tured consumer good, part of which is exported to the rural sector in 
exchange for agricultural goods. The latter sector has a choice either 
of producing only a single agricultural good some of which is exported 
to the urban sector using all available labour or using only part of its 
labour to produce this good while exporting the remaining labour to the 
urban sector in return for wages paid in the form of the manufactured 
good . Fe are thus assuming that the typical migrant retains his ties to 
the rural sector and, therefore, the income that he earns as an urban 
ker will be considered, from the standpoint of sectoral welfare, as 
:cruing to the rural sector/' However, this assumption is not at all 
lecessary fox our demonstration of the rationality of migration in the 
face of significant urban unemployment. 
The crucial assumption to be made in our model is that rural-urban 
migration will continue 30 long as the expected urban real income at the 
margin exceeds real agricultural product - i.e. prospective rural migrants 
behave as maximizers of expected utility. For analytical purposes, we 
shall assume that the total urban labour force consists of a permanent urban 
proletariat without ties to the rural sector plus the available supply of 
rural migrants. From this combined pool of urban labour, we assume that 
a periodic random job selection process exists whenever the number of 
available jobs is exceeded by the number of job seekers.Consequently, 
the expected urban wage will be defined as the fixed minimum wage (expressed 
in terms of manufactured goods) times the proportion of the- urban labour 
force actually employed (see equation (6). Finally, we assume perfectly 
competitive behaviour on the part of producers in both sectors with the 
further initial simplifying assumption that the price of agriculture (defined 
in terms of consumer goods) is determined directly by the relative quanti-
ties of the two goods produced. 
Consider nov the following mathematical and graphical formulation of 
the model. 
Agricultural Production Function; 
( 1 ) X A = f A ( N A , L > 
f». >0, f" <0 A A 
where, 
X is output of the agricultural good, 
N^ is the rural labour used to produce this output, 
L is the fixed ava: lability of land, and fj is the partial derivative 
of f with respect of N . A- A 
Manufacturing Production Function: •-••'-' •--•'•• 
( 2 ) = fi, K> f '>0, f" < 0 M M 
where, 
X^ . is the output of the manufactured consumer good, 
N is the total labour (urban and rural ) necessary to produce this 
output, 
K is fixed capital stock, and f' is the partial derivative of f . I- ti 
with respect to N:. K 
Price Determination; 
(3) P, = P oSi), .»«> 0 where 
A < V 
. .i P the price of the agricultural good in terms of the consumer good, A, 
(i.e., the terms of trade) is a function of the relative outputs 
of agricultural and consumer goods When the consumer good serves as 
. 6 numeraire. 
Agricultural Real Uage Determination; 
( 4 ) T J A = P A ' f l 
where, 
T t h e agricultural real wage, is equal to the value of labour's mar-
ginal product in agriculture expressed in terms of the consumer 
good. 
Manufacturing Real Wage; 
(5) ^ = f' £ f?K. 
• • - , • * • 
The real wage in manufacturing, expressed in terms of consumer goods, 
is equated with the marginal product of labour in manufacturing because 
of profit maximization on the part of perfectly competitive producers. 
However, this wage is constrained to be greater than or equal to the 
fixed minimum urban wage. In our analysis, we shall be dealing only with 
cases in which f' = V (i.e., there is never an excess demand for labour M. K. . j 
at the minimum wage). 
Urban Expected Wage 
e — (6) T,u - ^ . N,. 5 Nh , x 
N N u i. 
where the expected real wage in the urban sector, T^ is equal to the 
• > 
minimum real wage W^ adjusted for the proportion of the total urban labour 
force(permanent urban plus migrants denoted as H ) actually employed 
• Only in the case of full employment in the urban sector is the expec-
Nu 
ted wage equal to the minimum wage. 
Labour Endowment; 
(7) N + N = N_ + N = N A u R u 
that is, there is a labour constraint such that the sum of workers employed 
in the agricultural sector (N^) plus the total urban labor force (N^) must 
equal the sum of initial endowments of rural (N ) and permanent urban (N^) 
labour which in turn equals the total labour endowment (N). 
Equilibrium Condition; 
(8) VT. = V o A. u 
Equation (3), an equilibrium condition, is derived from the hypothesis 
that migration to the urban area is a positive function of the urban-rural 
expected wage differential. This can be written formally as 
(9) lY = <j,~'JK \ P ffj. i>°> *(o) = 0 U - - • » ; A A J ' 
u —! 
where S is a time derivative. Clearly then, migration will cease only 
when the expected income differential is zero, the condition posited in (3). 
It is important to note that this assumes that a migrant gives up only his 
marginal product. Other assumptions could be made. Much of the literature 
has stressed that in peasant economies producers receive their average 
product which is higher than their marginal product. Indeed, this is at 
the heart of the well known Lewis and Fei-Ranis models. /_13 / /_8_/. 
However, these models ignore the migration decision and seem to assume 
that migrants continue to receive their share of peasant production yet 
migrate only if jobs are actually available. At least in Kenya it appears 
that migrants continue to receive income from land after migration and 
commonly hire labour to work on their farms in their absence. There is 
also a considerable group of landless individuals who work on farms for 
wages. Thus it would appear that our assumption is not unreasonable. The 
analysis could easily be modified to make earnings foregone equal to average 
7 
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product, however. 
Tve thus have 3 equations in 3 unknowns (X,, X. , IT , N , F , F , K A 1' A M A M u 
and P^) and given our production functions and the fixed minimum wage 
it is possible to solve for the equilibrium unemployment rate and, conse-
quently, the equilibrium expected wage, relative output levels and terms 
of trade. Let us analyse the equilibrium and the overall adjustment process 
in terms of the following diagrammatic representations of the model. 
Figure 1 brings together all 8 equations in terms of a four quadrant 
diagrammatic framework. The two production functions are shown in quadrants 
B and D. Given labor endowments as portrayed in quadrant C and these pro-
duction functions, a hypothetical production possibility curve MQZT is 
generated in quadrant A. However, with a given and fixed urban real wage 
T-7 , we see from quadrant 5 that the maximum consumer goods output will be 
OE - i.e. that output at which y — f^ T. Moreover, if we assume that the 
permanent urban labour endowment, N , cannot be transferred to the agricul-
tural sector, then the maximum attainable level of agricultural output 
would be OR as shown in quadrants A and D- Consequently, the operative 
production possibility curve is E"ZE. 
Now it is evident from this framework that the locus of full employ-
ment points is that shown by ZQ in quadrant A. And the only full employ-
ment point consistent with the prevailing minimum wage would be point Z. 
But is point Z an equilibrium point as defined in our model, that is, 
is the expected urban wage (in fact T<7 = F^ at Z) equal to the value of 
agricultural marginal product? Consider the transfer of an additional 
worker from the rural to the urban sector, i.e. rural employment falls to 
N* - 1 in quadrant D while the urban labour supply rises to N* + 1 in 
quadrant B. We see from quadrant (3) that, given W , this migration will 
result in positive urban unemployment thereby lowering the expected wage 
F^, equal to the s pa of AF, below the minimum wage ¥ , equal to the 
slope of AZ. (recall our random selection assumption). But this expected 
wage is equal to FG = DE = VS consumption goods. The loss in agricultural 
output is X* J = VZ. But given the terms of trade, assumed to be 
the sj,":pe of derived from (3), these VZ agricultural goods are 
11G u ft L ^L 
equivalent to Z T consumer good. SinceZT<VS = VQ the migrant will gain 
income measured in terms of the consumer good by leaving the farm. 
Alternativelya we see that his expected consumer goods earnings through 
migration(vQ)is equivalent in value to QY agricultural goods at the terms 
of trade associated with point V on the actual production frontier. Since 
QY is greater than VZ the migrant also gains income measured in terms of 
the agricultural good. Consequently, we may conclude that there will be 
further migration and that equilibrium can be obtained only with urban 
g 
unemployment. Even though such an equilibrium, say at point H in quadrant 
A at which (3) is also satisfied, necessarily implies a suboptimum situa-
tion from the point of view of the economy as a whole, it does represent 
a rational, utility maximizing choice from the point of view of individual 
rural-urban migrants and, as will be demonstrated below, will likely 
represent a welfare improvement for the rural sector as a whole. 
So far we have assumed that an equilibrium solution to the equation 
system exists. We will make no attempt here to prove such existence but 
will remain content to assert that such is the case. However, we do want 
to investigate the stability of equilibrium in the model. To do so, let's 
differentiate <fi (equation (9)) with respect to N keeping in mind that 
dN = » dN according to (7). We obtain u A 
(10) - - I' P 2 
d Nu * ! 7 t 7 ? + PA £"A + "XT < £ P U ii 
Stability requires d<j> ^ q vchich is satisfied if 
- w u 
W N z M K P. f? 
6 P ^ ( N u ) 2 
A A 
The right hand side of this inequality is unambiguously positive, hence 
our assumption that Sp^ will certainly insure stability and indeed 
A 
is stronger than necessary. The adjustment mechanism may be made more 
clear by the phase diagram, Figure 2 in which the function <f> is plotted* 
FIGURE 2 
V i 
Its positive slope reflects the hypothesis that migration flows will increase 
with the magnitude of the urban~rural expected wage differential. In Figure 
2, $ is plotted under the assumption that <j> (o) = 0, hence the horizontal 
intercept is at the origin (in general the intercept would be a) and have 
further made the purely arbitrary assumption that $ is a linear function. 
The arrows show direction of adjustment in accordance with (10). If 
K PA fA~/ > 0, then N > 0 but we know that if ft > 0, the expected 
N U U 
wage differential will decrease. 
Additional migration, by 
increasing N^ without affecting N will reduce the expected urban real wage 
through increased unemployment while transfer of labour out of agriculture 
raises f^ and reduced agricultural output will also cause -PA to rise. Thus 
migration reduces the wage differential up to the point that it is zero 
ana equilibrium is achieved when there is no further incentive for 
migration. 
One other point might be raised at this juncture. So, far we have 
assumed that the urban minimum wage is fixed in terms of the consumer good. 
What, if instead, the minimum wage were fixed in terms of the agricultural 
good? 
We would then substitute for equation (5) 
" " V - ^ 
• A • i ~ 
M 
Substituting (4) and (5') into (7) we get the equilibrium relationship 
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Fe can then imagine an economy starting initially at production point Z on 
the production possibilities frontier (Figure lA) again assuming that 
f' H Ny at that point. The adjustment process will again be 
fi < A A N u £ reached through a simultaneous raising of PA f', and lowering of As 
relative agricultural output falls, P will rise. This in turn will cause ii. 
output of the consumer good to fall since producers will produce only up 
to the point that f• = V rises in terms of consumer goods and f* can be t'-i li la 
raised only through output restriction (f^ < 0). Therefore, in general 
we would find the equilibrium point lying southwest of Z and south of H. 
Output of both goods suffers. Whether this will cause more or less un-
employment than in the initial case is indeterminate since N falls. ri 
Although our initial assumption is a bit easier to handle, the 
general conclusion remains unaffected if we make the minimum wage fixed 
"in terms of the agricultural good. Equilibrium is only achievable with 
unemployment. Actual minimum wage setting is usually done with reference 
to some general cost of living index, and food is the largest single item 
in the budget of most urban workers /_ 20_/, / 21 /. Hence, the second 
case may be somewhat more realistic. Note that in the first case the 
"true" real wage was reduced somewhat by the rising agricultural good price, 
while in the latter case it is increased by the falling price of the 
consumer good. 
III. Policy Alternatives 
A. Agricultural Price Fixing 
One very common area of economic policy making in less developed 
countries relates to the question of the role of the agricultural sector 
in the overall development process. Policy measures in several countries 
have for numerous reasons been directed towards keeping agricultural prices 
from rising. Kenya and Ghana among others, have instituted government 
agencies to handle the collection and distribution of major crops at fixed 
prices; India has strictiy controlled inter-state trade in food crops. If 
the price of the agricultural good ware fixed in tems of the price of the 
consumer good in our model (i.e. if P were fixed), then it is clear that 
the entire adjustment of • P ; fj will have to be'in the f® term. Equilibrium i:. LI ex 
will occur only with -a - hi shier.: f'and lower . than if P were allowed to A u A 
vary. Hence, the effect of such price policy will be to increase the 
equilibrium level of unemployment. Thus, although economists have widely, 
recognized the potentially harmful effects of such policy on the growth 
of agricultural output, the effect on urban unemployment has not generally 
been considered. 
In our model, if P, is fixed there is a determinate level of unemploy-A 
ment and agricultural output, but the markets for goods would not clear at 
this price since the fixed ?• would not be consistent with the relative, 
quantities of the 'two goods produced at the "equilibrium", TTith our 
extremely simple price determining equation (3) there would be excess 
9 
demand for the agricultural good and excess supply of the consumer good. 
In. terms of the'model there wr/jId in general not be an equilibrium 
consistent with both V,. and p fixed. One way in which equilibrium could 
be attained would be 'obtriniTg agricultural goods from outside the economy 
such as through p.L. <V30 .a.d from" the U.S.10 The point that we wish to 
make is that the provision of such aid may serve to allow pursuit of a . 
policy of keeping :£-ood price' low and this in turn leads to higher levels 
•of open urban unemployment tl an would otherwise persist. Thus the gains 
in real income accruing to tl r. recipient country are at least partially 
offset by unemployment? • . • 
3. Planning in '"erms of Shi t rw pricest A Parable of Incomplete Analysis. 
Suppose that there is ?r economy that behaves according to our model 
and that the government of i te country becomes concerned about the high• 
level of urban unemployment <.bSociated with its equilibrium at point H 
(Figure lA). It, therefore, contracts for the services of a high powered 
economist to come and r acorn:, end policies to solve the problem. The 
economist arrives ar.d soon < cnfirncthe fact that there is indeed a lot 
of open urban unemployment. He does a quick calculation on the back of 
an envelope and find ; that ( be minimum wage is four times the marginal 
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product in agriculture (which is positive, however). He is also told by 
the Minister of Economic Pi anning that it is politically impossible to 
lower the minimum wage in real terms so that he had better think of some 
other solution. 
Our economist, being familiar with the current development literature* 
announces that this is a clear case of money costs diverging from social 
costs and that the government should use a shadow price for labor in plann-
ing output of the manufactured good. The Minister of Economic Development 
is a bit puzzled at first, but soon the visiting economist convinces him of 
the wisdom of pricing factors in terms of opportunity cost. The Minister 
then asks what shadow price they should use. The Economist gains quick 
access to a computer and improvises a linear programming model of the 
economy. In the first version, he uses a general labor constraint and 
finds that the associated dual variable has a value of zero. He then runs 
a second version with separate urban and rural labor "constraints and finds 
associated dual variables of zero and a positive, but low, value respectively. 
Having just told the Minister that the shadow price to be used is just the 
value of the dual variable, he is a bit embarrassed when asked which of 
the dual values to use, / 4 /. Although his first instinct is to say that 
the appropriate shadow price is zero since the urban unemployed comprise 
a pool of redundant labor which can be tapped, he then remembers reading 
Little's article which shows that even with a marginal product of zero 
there is a positive opportunity cost of hiring additional labor since total 
consumption will rise. 19*7 After a bit of head scratching our expert 
becomes somewhat conservative and says that the shadow price to use is 
the marginal product in agriculture. He claims that if a wage subsidy is 
so 
paid to private producers/that the effective cost of hiring labour is 
equal to this shadow price and if government enterprises hire labour as 
long as it is profitable using the shadow price, the economy will move to 
an efficient production point since this will equate marginal products in 
the two sectors.^ A quick calculation using the manufacturing production 
function and unemployment data suggests that such a scheme should expand 
industrial employment by enough to eliminate existing unemployment. 
The Minister quickly replies that this will cause budgetary problems 
since the public corporations will run deficits and substantial.amounts of 
subsidy will have to be paid to private firms. There will probably be 
complaints from parliament that the public firms are inefficient as evi-
denced by their deficits and that windfall profits are being given to. 
capitalists. The Economist ponders this for a moment and explains that 
parliament has to be educated on this issue and volunteers to address a 
special session. 
Parliament is convened. The Economist explains the issues just as 
he has to the Minister, and ,is given a five-minute standing ovation at 
the end of the presentation.: One member rises to propose a motion that 
minimum wage legislation be repealed so as to allow wages to reflect social 
costs. He argues that this would avoid budgetary complications involved 
in actually implementing planning using shadow prices. The motion is 
soundly defeated. 
A second member then rises to propose a motion that a wage subsidy 
be paid to employers so as to equate social and private costs of hiring 
labor. A good debate ensues with arguments about subsidy to capitalists 
and need to keep on good terms with aid-giving nations. The latter argu-
ment carries the day and the motion is passed unanimously. 
Then the Finance Minister rises and says that he wants to ask the 
Economist a question. How could the subsidy be financed? The Economist 
answers that they should raise the revenue through non-distorting lump-sum 
taxes. Suddenly the Finance Minister jumps up again and says that this 
would involve redistributing income in favor of industrial workers at the 
expense of peasants since they are the principal candidates for taxation. 
He is told that if that is undesirable they might reconsider repealing 
minimum wage legislation. The Finance Minister then tables a resolution 
calling for a tax on land to be used to pay the wage subsidy. The motion 
carries unanimously.. The Economist is thanked profusely on behalf of the 
Parliament and Cabinet, collects his fee, and• heads for the airport confident 
that he had indeed solved the unemployment problem. 
A few months later the Finance Minister asks to address a special 
session of Parliament. He announces that the new policy has failed 
miserably. Since inauguration of the wage subsidy, employment in the 
consumer goods indu. try has increased by somewhat more than the initial 
amount of unemployment. Nevertheless, there remains alarmingly high 
unemployment and agricultural output has dropped substantially. Food 
prices have risen. Furthermore, in order to finance the wage subsidy 
the land tax has caused rural unrest and tax collectors are being massa-
cred. A telegram is immediately dispatched summoning the Economist to 
return and explain what has happened. 
He arrives on the next plane and goes directly into session with the 
Finance Minister and the new Minister of Economic rlanning (the first one 
had been sacked). After reviewing the available facts, he begins to 
reali ze that both he and tlie literature on shadow—pricing failed to anti-
cipate the indirect cffects of the policy he had recommended. Specifically, 
ir.co 
he did not take/account the fact that total migration to the urban areas 
would increase in response to the wage subsidy. He asks for a couple of 
weeks to analyse the situation in more detail. 
At the end of the period he returns, smiles a bit nervously, and 
assures the Ministers that he now has the answer. He pulls out of his 
brief case a document that identical to Fart II of this paper. You 
see, he continues, I have found that individuals in this economy migrate 
up to the point that their earnings in agricultural employment are equated 
with their expected urban earnings. As industrial employment increased 
as a result of the wage subsidy, unemployment '.'as initially reduced. But 
the lower unemployment, rate increased expected urban income which in turn 
induced addition-1.! rural-urban migration. Figure 3 will make clear what 
happened (Fig. 3 corresponds to Fig. 1 A)* 
Tvhen I arrived the economy was producing at point H. Because of the 
minimum wage, output of the consumer good was restricted to the quantity 
OX* . If individuals did net migrate in response to expected wage tl. 
differentials, the economy could have produced at point Z, but instead 
migration with unemployment reduced agricultural output to the level OQ. 
The standard theory of shadow pricing led me to believe that through 
wage subsidies the economy would have moved close to point N on the 

production possibilities frontier at which the output of manufactured good 
would have increased by HN with agricultural output constant. Indeed, 
with further adjustment of the subsidy to reflect changing marginal pro-
ductivies and prices, the economy could have reached L, the optimum 
position. Since all individuals in this economy have identical homothetic 
preference, maps and this government has an individualistic social welfare 
function, w£ can draw social indifference curves. The economy would have 
moved,:therefore, from a welfare level of V to a higher level, U^. 
Instead, the wage subsidy caused the economy to move to point J. The 
price of the agricultural good (equal to the slope of the indifference 
curve at.the production point) increased. At point J, = ¥ uand mig-
ration ceased. It is clear that the subsidy had to cause the economy to : 
move northwest of H since additional urban employment would cause more 
migration, hence agricultural output would have to decrease. If the equi-
librium were east of \] * the economy would have been better off than at 
H. As it happened, the equilibrium1 at J has a welfare value Uf which 
represents a worsening of welfare. Had the subsidy been increased to-the 
point that unemployment were eliminated the economy would have moved to 
K, the only efficient production point at which P £' = It is clear A A M 
that such subsidy would carry sectoral reallocation too far since consumer 
goods output in excess of X* can only occur with f^ hence the margi-
nal product in manufacturing will always have to be lower than the value 
of the marginal product in agriculture. Such a policy would increase wel-
fare if it lay on the segment FN of the production possibilities frontier. 
The standard theory led me awry because it failed to consider the effect 
of the subsidy on migration. 
C. Back-to-the-Land Folicies; The Farable Continued 
The new Minister for Economic Planning looks at Figure ^ and says, 
"If we would just restrict migration so as to force the unemployed back 
to the land, it is clear that we can make the economy better off. Keeping 
the minimum wage we will continue to get consumer good output of X* and 
with full employment insured by restricting migration agricultural output 
will be X*. We will be producing on the production possibilities frontier a. • •-
at Z and the economy is unambiguously better off than at H." With visions 
- 17 - " 
of achieving a.welfare level of U^ he is about to rush off to get approval 
of an enforced back-to-the-land policy. However, the Finance Minister 
interjects that there is enough trouble in the. rural areas already. If, 
being denied the opportunity to export its labour, the rural sector'as a 
whole were to be. made worse off it would be political dynamite. He then 
turns to the Economist for advice. Our expert replies that unquestionably, 
Z would be better in an aggregate welfare sense than H. In this particular 
case it is also better than J or K although in general back-to-the-land 
may or may not be superior to wage subsidy. He points out that at Z the 
economy is still not achieving its potential optimum L and that the value 
of marginal product in agriculture will remain lower than the minimum wage 
which with no unemployment is equal to the expected wage. It is clear, 
however, that at Z the economy will have as much of the consumer good and 
more: of the agricultural good than at H, hence, there exists some pattern 
of income transfers that would make no one worse off and many better off 
than at H. The Finance Minister comments that he has already heard about 
lump-sum transfers and has gotten into hot water as a result. The 
Economist replies that Figure 4 may make the issue more clear. The line 
M'T' represents production possibilities for the agricultural sector when 
some or all of its labour endowment is engaged in urban manufacturing. 
If its entire endowment Of labor is devoted to agricultural production, 
it will produce a quantity OM'. However, by exporting its labour it can 
"produce" the manufactured, good (wages^ are paid in the form of this good). 
Hence this kind of production possibilities frontier depends on market 
forces (wage, levels and unemployment) as well as on purely technological 
factors. The slope of the frontier is the marginal rate of transforma-
tion between agricultural and consumer goods for the sector and can be 
written as 
* 1 XA 
(12) dxJJ ns L a 
= where -dN^ = dNu , X^ is the total amount of 
A u * . 
6 N R u 
the manufactured good received in the form of wages by the sector, and 
R . j 
Nu is the total number of rural migrants in the urban labour force. 
- 18 - " 
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The numerator gives the amount of agricultural production given up by 
transfering one worker into "labour export." The denominator is the amount 
of additional manufactured goods earned as a' result of the transfer of an 
additional worker into labor export. Clearly, this latter term will depend 
on wages and unemployment. Since the expected wage is assumed to equal 
the actual wages received by the sector, the total "production" of con= 
sumer goods by the rural sector is equal to the expected wage times the 
number of individuals from that sector who are exporting labour. 
Symbolically, 
N
M . N R (13> ^ = 
N u 
Hence the denominator of (12) is 
6NR ~ Nu ' U \ (N )2 u \ u 
Thus we can rewrite (10) as 
( 1 2 , ) f ,A f» 
dXA V - N S / F " v " 7 " R A "M u / liM ^ V y v J l \ 
(n u ) 2 / V Nu : 
In addition to these production possibilities, the rural sector also 
has the opportunity to trade some of its output with the urban sector in 
order to increase its welfare. Corresponding to each point on its produc-
tion possibilities frontier there is a determinate price of the agricul= 
12 
tural good . An important question to ask, however, concerns the way 
in which rural welfare is affected by the choice of particular output = 
consumption constellation. It can be shown that the rural sector's wel-
fare is maximized when equation (14) is satisfied (see Appendix for 
derivation). 
(14> V a un 
„ E i-i u n 
where, n is the elasticity of the permanent urban labour forces' 
13 offer curve of the consumer good in exchange for the agricultural good, 
and, R is the rural sector's proportion of the total urban labour force, 
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NR i • e • , R == ^  a 
u 
Equation (14) can be interpreted in the following manner. 
P.f' (1 - —) is the amount of consumer goods sacrificed by the rural cx ci ^ 
sector as a result of removing one worker from producing the agricultural 
good which would have been exchanged for the consumer good at the market 
price 1 / E T h i s quantity is less than the value of the marginal product 
of labor in agriculture (PAf®^) since the reduction in output has a favoura-
ble terms-of=trade effect. If the demand for the agriculture good is 
inelastic (n <1) we reach the startling conclusion that the sacrifice 
becomes negative! This is of course, the familiar proposition that aggre-
gate farm income may be increased through reducing output. The direct 
gain in consumer goods achieved by the rural sector through exporting an 
additional unit of labor is W (1-R). The migrant earns the expected g 
wage W but his migration, by increasing unemployment, reduces the 
expected wage (and earnings) of all migrants already in the urban labour 
, 14 force. 
1 E As long as P £' (1 - —) <W (1-R) the welfare of the rural sector A n u , 
will be increased by allowing migration even though unemployment ensues and 
the economy as a whole sacrifices output. Since P^f^ and W^ are always 
positive and R <_ 1, additional migration will always "benefit the rural 
sector when n<l- "In general, the lower is 'P.f«, n , or R arid the higher • s\. ii 
is W^ the more will the rural sector benefit from the opportunity to 
migrate. -. ' 
Consider now the choice facing the individual prospective migrant. 
This individual, acting as a price taker, Will migrate as long as P f^ 
' u* 
We see, therefore, that his decision will not in general lead to welfare 
maximization for the whole sector. His expected gain in income from mig-
ration exceeds that of the sector to the extent that he neglects the 
effect of additional unemployment on the earnings of others from the same 
sector. On the other hand, he overstates the loss of income from reduced 
agricultural output by ignoring the terms of trade effect. If 1 n 
there will be too little migration from the standpoint of the sector as 
a whole. Conversely, if there will be too much migration when 
n x 
decisions are made solely from the point of view of individual utility 
maximization. 
From the foregoing, one can conclude that although a back-to-the-land-
policy will clearly improve' aggregate welfare of the economy, it will 
likely require substantial compensation to the rural sector if it is not 
to be made worse off as a result-of removing the opportunity -for free 
migration. Clearly the permanent urban labour force will be made better 
off by becoming fully employed at the high minimum' wage while also being 
able to buy food at a lower price. Those migrants who are allowed and 
continue to export labor will similarly earn more but this gain will be 
offset by reduced total labor exports and lower agricultural prices. 
Whether or not this will be true depends, of course, On the specific para-
meters for this economy. If n is sufficiently high, the rural sector 
could be made better off by restricting migration in the absence of compen-
sation, but this is highly unlikely. Perhaps this is most clearly 
illustrated in Figure 4. H® corresponds to the initial unemployment 
equilibrium H (Figure 1). At that point the rural sector as a whole 
"produces" X° and X^ of the two goods. It also: has the opportunity to 
trade at the price P°. By trading some of its agricultural output to 
the permanent urban sector for additional manufactured goods, it consumes 
^M achieves a-welfare level of uR. An enforced back-to-the-land 
policy results in the sector's producing XJ, X^ ,. If it could still trade 
at price P° it would clearly be better off but this is impossible. At 
g' the price of the agricultural good will fall to P' and with trade the 
best consumption hurdle attainable by the sector is X^,^x^ which corres-,T 
ponds to a lower level of welfare uR. (Note that if P' did not cut M'T' o - _ A 
there would be no incentive to migrate at 3.) 
At this point enthusiasm for an enforced back-to-the-land policy is 
rapidly waning» The ministers of Economic Planning and Finance throw 
up their hands. Maybe letting the economy return to its old equilibrium 
at H (Figure 1) wouldn't be so bad after all, they say in unease. 
The Economist immediately replies, "there is still another possibility 
a policy package that will be optimal." 
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D= The Optimal Policy Package; . The Parable Concluded . 
Look back at Figure 3, he'says. Even if the back=to=the=land policy 
can be implemented'so that the economy produces at 2 and the rural sector 
is ^ compensated so as to be no worse" 'off than at H, we could still do 
better. At 2 the value of the marginal product in agriculture (P^f^) i s 
less than the marginal product in the, manufactured goods industry 
(fjl = Wu);« For general welfare maximization for the economy as a whole we 
know that P f^ = f^ .. Only then will the marginal rate of transformation 
in production equal the marginal rate of substitution in consumption. 
Clearly, this is point L. In order to- reach this point some wage subsidy 
will, have to be paid since you insist on maintaining the minimum wage. 
It will have to equal ¥ = X1 when f' = P,f'° However, when this point • u >1 M A A 
E — E is reached, since there is full employment. W = W but, P f® <¥ . Hence r J • u U| ' A A u 
individuals will still find it in their interest to migrate and you will 
repeat the. process of moving to J (-Figure 3). Clearly, measures must be 
taken to restrict further migration. Ive see.therefore, that we can. reach 
the best possible, position only through planning and implementing with 
appropriate shadow prices and migration control. The rural sector will be 
; to 
better off if the economy moves fror.r ' "> (Fig. 3) (in the absence of compen-
E sation) providing at both 3 and L, 3 f® (1 ~ 1)< W (1-R) which is likely A A — u 
although clearly not necessary. Ey in. if we can ascertain .that ..moving, from 
2 to L represents a welfare improvement, we cannot in general assert .that 
L represents an improvement over H f.-cm the standpoint of the rural sector.-' 
The entire analysis of the preceding section can. be applied to compare 
H and L. It is plausible, but not necessary, that the move from H to L 
will require compensation to the rural sector if it is not to be made 
(see footnote l-:a). 
worse off/_ But. we can say with, ctrtainty that, if compensation; is required, 
it will .be smaller at L than at 2 \nd furthermore it should :be easier to 
finance since if the rural secto? remains, at the-same welfare level as 
at H, the welfare of the urban sector at L will be higher at L than at g. 
In summary,. Gentlemen, -says t ie .Economist.i the optimal policy for 
you to pursue is the following. Grs ift a,wage subsidy as long as the 
marginal product, of labour in the co lsumer goods industry exceeds the 
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value of its marginal product in agriculture. When they are equated,, the 
subsidy should remain at the level necessary to maintain the relationship 
and direct measures to prohibit further rural-urban migration must be 
instituted (a prohibitive discriminatory tax on additional migrants would 
be equivalent to direct controls). 
Even so there are corresponding fiscal requirements that cannot be 
taken lightly. If, to make the policy package politically feasible, com-
pensation of the rural sector is required as well as wage subsidy (or 
operating deficit of government-owned plants), any government may in fact 
find it difficult to find non-distorting taxes capable of raising suffi-
cient revenue. Perhaps a head-tax on all urban residents would be feasible 
although this too raises the issue of the terms in which minimum wages are 
set (unions in Tropical Africa have been quite aware of net real wages 
and. have, in many cases, successfully fought to maintain the real after-
tax wage). A tax on rural land is ruled out if there must be net subsidy 
to the rural sector which leaves an urban land tax as the remaining 
potential tax (we have assumed the absence of pure profits in industry). 
This time the Economist, after being thanked, heads for the airport 
confident that his advice will not boomerang. 
IV. Suggested Extensions and Modifications 
The model which we have used in this paper is extremely simple. As 
always, simplicity is gained only through " compromises . 
with reality. Nevertheless, we believe that this model captures the 
essence of the migration cum unemployment process that is a prevalent 
phenomenon in the "third world." As such, it gives insight into a 
pressing issue of public policy. In this section we will suggest some 
directions in which the analysis can and should be extended in order to 
increase its realism and usefulness. 
The most obvious limitat ion of the analysis is its static character. 
We intend to remedy this by incorporating migration in response to expec-
ted income differentials into a growth model in a subsequent paper., If 
savings propensities differ between the sectors, if investment is sector 
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specific, and if there are differential rates of technical progress 
(arising through "learning by doing") between the sectors, then some of 
the conclusions based solely on arguments of static efficiency may have 
to be modified. Migration is a disequilibrium phenomenon and even casual 
observation in Africa suggests that the flows are, if anything, still 
increasing. A general model of dynamic disequilibrium would be desirable 
although such models are notoriously intractible. The assumption we have 
made that all migrants actually earn the expected wage, difficult to 
accept but necessary for analytical purposes, actually derives from a 
more realistic construct set in context of a growing economy. / 24 / 
Despite this, our preliminary investigations in this direction give us 
is 
confidence that the model presented here/a useful analytical tool. 
Within the static context it would be desirable to introduce more 
complete and realistic demand functions. Distribution effects could not 
be ignored if income elasticities differing from unity were introduced 
and/or if tastes differed systematically between groups. However, our 
results derive only from price of a good being inversely related to changes 
in the relative quantity of its production. (Even this condition is 
stranger than necessary, see p.4N<6). This need not be universally true 
but is consistent with a large mass of empirical observation within 
limited ranges of income redistribution. 
Another desirable modification would be to increase the number of 
sectors to be considered from a welfare standpoint. In the rural sector 
it would be useful to consider landowning and non-landowning classes' 
separately since, as extended family relationships weaken and land becomes 
more scarce, the assumption of intra sectoral population homogeneity and 
compensation becomes less tenable. Similarly, distinction between capi-
talist and worker classes in the urban area could be useful. Introduction 
of an urban "seriii-modern" production sector which hires labour at wages 
below the official minimum would also add realism. / 3_/ /_ 9 / 
Our specification of the expected urban wage is much too simple. 
We are presently in the early stages of empirically testing the migration 
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hypothesis in Kenya using a more complicated function for expectation 
formation. So far casual observation by us and statements by experienced 
observers suggest that the hypothesis is broadly correct. /_ 15__/ p. 183) 
So long as expected income is positively related with minimum wages and 
inversely related with unemployment, this model gives qualitatively... 
correct results. It is quite possible that equilibrium could only occur 
with positive rural-urban wage differentials in the absence of unemployment 
as a result of preferences for rural life /12 / /_13; / /_ 17 / (some 
sociological studies of the magnetic attraction of cities might suggest 
the opposite 11~/). If such differentials reflect preferences,which 
the social welfare function respects, then the optimality criterion of 
equal values of marginal product between sectors has to be appropriately 
modified. Somewhat similarly, if migration gives rise to social costs 
through increased infrastructure requirements, higher crime rates, etc., 
the optimality criterion will also have to be modified to take this into 
account. 
Finally, we have considered compensation only through lump-sum taxes 
and subsidies. If instead \<re realistically add the use of commodity taxes 
as a fiscal tool for redistribution the analysis will have to be modified 
— 15 
along lines suggested by Diamond and Mirlees./ 36 / Their essential 
point is that if lump-sum taxes and subsidies are infeasible, optimality 
requires productive efficiency without equating marginal rates of substi-
tution and transformation. 
V- Conclusions 
Rural-urban migration in the face of urban unemployment and positive' 
earnings in agriculture has been shown to be a rational response by 
individuals when urban wages are kept at a high level through minimum 
wage .legislation o.r collective action. The. crucial assumption, the 
implications of which we have explored, is that individuals migrate in 
response to expected income differentials. 
We have shown that the standard remedy for such .unemployment, 'namely, 
the expansion.of job opportunities in the manufacturing sector through 
labour subsidies or direct government hiring in accordance with a 
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profitability criterion using .a..shadow, price for labour will lead either 
to overexpansion of the urban sector or will fail to eliminate unemployment.. 
Furthermore, the fiscal requirements for subsidy are likely to prove 
extremely onerous. Such a policy may or may not lead to an improvement 
in welfare even with perfect lump-sum compensation. At least, it will 
lead to a productively efficient but non-Pareto»optimal position. 
A forced back-to=the=land movement of all unemployed individuals 
will lead to an unambiguous aggregate welfare improvement. However, in 
the absence of compensation it is highly likely that the rural sector 
(defined to include all migrants who retain ties to the sector) will be 
made worse off. If their welfare is politically important, such a policy 
would be extremely difficult to pursue. This,policy will lead to an 
efficient but non-Pareto=optimal point. 
Pareto-optimality can be achieved only through a policy package 
combining employment.expansion in accordance with shadow pricing and 
migration restriction. Again, the rural sector is likely to require 
compensation if it is not to be made worse off, but the required compen-
sation will be less than under a back-to~the~land policy alone. 
Governments, no doubt, are caught in a dilemma. Neither eliminating 
minimum wage legislation nor placing physical controls on migration are 
likely to be politically palatable although the latter policy is somewhat 
of an 
less/anatbama. The alternative, however, is to continue to suffer subs-
tantial and growing levels of open unemployment in urban areas. 
The long run implications of this phenomenon (i.e.3 the loss of 
potential output and, perhaps more importantly, the proliferation of 
social and political unrest are only now beginning to be recognized in 
newly independent developing nations. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. For some empirical evidence on the great magnitude of these earnings 
differentials in less developed economies, see Berg (2) also Ch&i" (10) 
and .International Labor Office (l6). 
2. We do not make the special assumption of an agricultural labour surplus 
for the following reasons. Most available empirical evidence to date 
tends to cast doubt.on the labour surplus argument•in the- context of 
those economies of Southeast Asia and Latin American countries where 
such a, surplus would be most likely (22). (23) (5). Moreover, few if 
any economists would seriously argue that general labour surplus exists 
in tropical Africa, the area to which this paper is most directly 
related. 
3. For a dynamic model of labour migration in which urban unemployment 
rates and expected incomes play a pivotal role in the migration 
process, see M. Todaro (2k). However, unlike the present model which 
attempts, to view the migration process in the context of aggregate 
and intersectoral welfare considerations, this model was strictly 
concerned with the formulation of a positive theory of urban unemploy-
ment in developing nations. As such, it did not specifically consider 
the welfare of the rural sector. Nor was it concerned with some of 
the broader issues of economic policy considered in the present paper. 
b. In tropical Africa especially, this notion that migrants retain their 
ties to the rural sector is quite common and-manifested by the pheno-
menon of extended family ties and remittances to rural relatives of 
large proportions of urban earnings. However, the reverse flow, i.e., 
rural-urban monetary transfers > is also quite common in cases where the 
migrant is temporarily unemployed and, therefore, must be supported 
by rural relatives. "''v 
5. Again, the qualitative conclusions of the model do not depend on the 
precise nature of the selection process. We have assumed random selec-
tion, however, not merely for analytic convenience but also because 
it directly corresponds to an appropriate dynamic construct developed 
in Todaro (2^). There it is shown that over time expected and actual 
earning will converge to a positive number even though the rate of job 
creation is less than the rate of migration so that unemployment is 
increasing. 
6. A sufficient, but not necessary, condition for this assumption is a 
unitary income elasticity of demand for both goods with all individuals 
in the economy having the same preference map. Again, the assumption 
is made for analytical convenience. The qualitative conclusions of 
our analysis will remain unaffected under several plausible assumptions 
about distribution of income and tastes. 
7. <j> (o) = 0 is purely arbitrary. If, instead, we assume <f> (a) = 0 
where a can take on any value, migration will cease when the urban-
rural expected wage differential is equal to a . None of the subse-
quent analysis is affected qualitatively by specifying a = 0. (8) 
would merely be written as W, + a = W . A u 
8. It is theoretically possible, but not likely, that the institutional 
minimum wage could be c-qual to the free market full employment equilib-
rium wage in which case the actual and expected urban wage would be 
identical. In such a case conventional analysis suffices. 
9. Even if we were more realistic and allowed for income and redistribu-
tion effects on demand, the conclusion of excess demand would generally 
hold.if income elasticities for agricultural goods were low. 
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10o Several issues arise regarding the finance and sale of aid-provided 
food which would require substantial modification of the model through 
adding government and foreign-trade sectors, lie will not pursue 
this further here. 
11. Hagen ( /_12 / p. 498) states, "a subsidy per unit of labour equal to 
the wage differential / between agriculture and industry-/ will 
increase real income further/~than a tariff^ and if"combined 
with free trade will permit attaining an optimum optimorum. 
Bardhan (/_1 / p. 379) similarly adds. "The best remedy for the 
misallocation caused by a wage differential is....an appropriate 
subsidy to the use of labour in the manufacturing industry." It is 
important to recall that this argument is dependent on variable 
proportions production functions. If production coefficients are fixed, 
wage subsidy will have no effect in the short run. The classic 
statement of this case is Echaus / 7 / and Bardhan / 1~ explores 
its implications for subsidy in a. dynamic context. Both of these 
papers, however, posit surplus labour in agriculture, an assumption 
we do not wish to make in an African context. 
12. Note that aggregate output of consumer goods remains constant, hence 
price Is'determined by output of the agricultural good per (3). 
13. In considering the welfare of the rural sector as a whole we are 
making the tacit assumption that there is redistribution of goods 
between individuals in this sector. Although this is a very strong 
assumption, yet there is considerable evidence from Tropical Africa 
that employed urban migrants repatriate substantial portions of 
their earnings to their kinsmen remaining in the rural areas and 
conversely that income both in cash and kind is received by unemployed 
migrants from kinsmen remaining on the farm. To the extent that 
the extended family system does redistribute goods between members, . 
this assumption may be tenable as a first approximation. 
14. Note that if the urban unemployment was experienced only by migrants., 
this term would equal zero since the total amount of earnings through 
labour export would be constant. It can be positive only because 
the permanent urban labour force shares in unemployment, thereby 
reducing its share of the constant wage bill in the manufactured 
good Industry. 
15. For example, compensation might be effected through support of 
agricultural prices. If this is accomplished through keeping the .. 
producers' price higher than the sales price other taxes will have 
to be increased in crder to finance the subsidy and urban real wages .  
will rise through cheaper food prices. Alternatively if producers'. . 
price is supported and sales price is maintained at the same level, 
surpluses will accrue and these will have to be financed from 
government revenue. 
16. At present, Tanzania is attempting to cope with its unemployment 
problem' through just such a back-to-the-land policy. See /14_/ for 
an analysis of the economics of the Tanzanian program. 
lUa. As drawn in Fig. 3, L must represent a higher welfare level than H....... 
for. the rural sector since P rises (e.g. 3) and the sector produces.,-
more.of both goods. In fact if L lies along gN northwest, of the ray 
going through H there will be an -unambiguous sectoral welfare 
improvement. However if L lies southeast of the ray on 6K, the rural 
sector could be worse off than at H since P. falls. 
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